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ost real effects of the extension of European
Monetary Union (EMU) to new member
states have arguably already been realized. EMU
might increase trade because uncertainty from
changing currency values disappears, and for the
same reason it might also increase investment. But
given that many of the candidates for enlargement
are already de-facto members of EMU, as several
operate currency boards or have other forms of
more or less tight pegs to the euro,one should be for-
given for not expecting tremendous changes in these
areas. However, enlargement is likely to have an
impact on the way monetary policy is set. With
enlargement of the common currency area there will
also be an enlargement of the council which sets the
policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). New
members in the council could change the policy
stance of the larger institution. Moreover, a larger
currency area might imply changes in the optimal
policy with enlargement. Both changes could have
substantial influence on the way monetary policy is
set and how the private sector in member countries
reacts to these changes.
Changes in the ECB council
The new member countries are characterized by
shock structures that are different from those of the
older members. Especially the larger current mem-
bers often exhibit a low if not negative correlation to
supply and demand shocks in the new member states
(Fidrmuc and Korhonen 2003).This implies that new
members will often prefer a different monetary pol-
icy compared to that of current members,reinforcing
the problem that one-size common monetary policy
does not fit all. Moreover, some of these countries
are still characterized by higher growth rates and
therefore often have stronger price pressures due,
among other factors, to the Balassa-Samuelson
effect.This again might imply that new board mem-
bers bring different preferences to the ECB council
meetings.It does not mean,however,that new mem-
bers will favor more inflation as is often feared. It is
just as likely that they will push for a tighter mone-
tary policy in order to stem price pressures in their
national economies (Kenen and Meade 2003).
Of course, all this would mean nothing if all ECB
members were to represent only the European inter-
est and if all of them would have the same prefer-
ences concerning the trade-off between inflation and
stabilization of the real economy. In this case, addi-
tions to the monetary union would hardly influence
the common monetary policy stance,as new member
states are economically small and thus unlikely to
influence the European average by much. However,
this interpretation is probably too benign. More and
more evidence belies the officially voiced position
that decisions are taken by consensus and that the
ECB council decides solely with a truly European
perspective.This is not surprising as the whole point
of having regional representatives on the council is
to have someone representing regional perspectives.
Regional representation is meant to ensure that
more adequate information on regional develop-
ments is available to the council and also to ensure
that regional interests influence the common deci-
sion. Accordingly, empirical evidence suggests that
regional delegates vote with a distinct regional per-
spective, something that is also found in other feder-
al central banks, such as the US Federal Reserve
System and the German Bundesbank before EMU.
There is also suggestive evidence that this is not dif-
ferent in the ECB council (Meade and Sheets 2002,
Heinemann and Hüfner 2004).
This being the case, one might expect that the whole
monetary stance of the ECB could change if new
members were to bring different preferences or
needs for monetary stabilization to the council meet-
ings. To avoid too big a shift in monetary policy, a * University of Siegen and CESifo.
Regional representa-
tives to the ECB vote
with a regional 
perspectiveplan has been accepted by the European Council
that mandates a change in the ECB board once the
number of member states reaches 15 (European
Central Bank 2003).The ECB proposed a two- stage
reform, depending on the number of members. In a
first step,applicable for a monetary union of 15 to 21
members, two groups would be formed, the first
comprising the five largest economies (measured in
terms of GDP and the size of the banking sector).
This group would have between four and five votes,
the rest being rotated among the second group of
smaller economies. The overall number of votes for
national representatives would be restricted to 15.A
third group of countries would be formed once the
number of member states exceeds 21. In this case,
the first group would have 4 votes (so that members
in this group will be entitled to vote 80 percent of the
time),the second group,comprising half the member
states, would rotate through eight votes, and the
smallest economies would share three votes (see
Table). Since members in the respective groups
rotate through the assigned voting rights, larger
countries are more often entitled to vote than small-
er ones. However, at any given time, all countries
that do vote have the same weight and all members
are invited to discuss policy decisions, so that non-
voting countries are not excluded and could con-
tribute their opinion and expertise.The members of
the board, however, will retain full voting rights, so
that the overall number of voting members on the
council will remain at 21.
This reform, accepted by the European Council
and ratified in all members states, is a combination
of rotation, like it is practiced in the US Federal
Reserve System where some districts are not enti-
tled to vote all the time, and the system of repre-
sentation used in the International Monetary
Fund, where smaller countries form groups. Of
course, the reform implicitly leads to a higher cen-
tralization of monetary policy, because relative
power is shifted to the board, and a slight correc-
tion of the under-representation of larger countries
that currently exists in “the one country, one vote”
setup is achieved. The change in the council inci-
dentally follows the example of the extension of
the German monetary union to the former GDR.
Then as well, every federal state (Bundesland) was
no longer represented in the council of the
German Bundesbank which would have meant
16 regional representatives in addition to nine
board members. Instead, groups of federal states
where formed and the total number of regional
representatives was reduced to nine, while the
number of board members was restricted to a max-
imum of nine (of which not all are filled). This
implicitly gave more power to the Bundesbank
board just like the ECB reform gives more power
to the ECB board (Hefeker 2003).
Increased divergence of monetary transmission
A more important change will probably follow from
the fact that the new board, taking decisions in con-
sensus or voting on them, will face the fact of an
increased divergence of economic structures among
member states after enlargement. Different indus-
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trial structures, different banking systems, and dif-
ferent degrees of labor market centralization imply
that the transmission of monetary policy will
become more unequal than in the existing monetary
union where a considerable convergence of trans-
mission seems to have been taking place in recent
years (Angeloni and Ehrmann 2003). Because of
this convergence, starting even before the introduc-
tion of the euro, monetary policy tends to have
largely similar effects in most euro-zone countries.
However, the convergence among the candidates
for new membership is less advanced. Monetary
policy works differently in these countries and it is
asymmetric within the group of candidate countries
(Ganev et al 2002, de Haan et al. 2005, Egert and
McDonald 2006).What does this imply for the mon-
etary policy of the ECB?
A stronger divergence in the transmission of mon-
etary policy should lead the ECB to give more
attention to those countries which diverge from
the average (Gros and Hefeker 2002, Benigno
2004). This recommendation simply follows from
the fact that more variability in output and infla-
tion results in increasing losses in any country.The
more a country diverges from the average, the less
adequate is a policy tailored to the average of the
member countries, and hence the more risk there
is that these countries will suffer from inflation
and output variability. Hence, more weight should
be placed on developments in countries which are
further away from the average and for which
transmission of monetary policy is highly asym-
metric.
This, of course, presumes that differences in trans-
mission are well known and can be adequately
addressed by the central bank. But this need not be
the case in the larger EMU, at least in the immedi-
ate and foreseeable future. The transmission of
monetary policy is not only asymmetric, it will also
be uncertain because the ECB might not fully know
about how monetary policy translates into real vari-
ables in new member states,not least because many
of these countries are still in a process of restruc-
turing (De Grauwe and Senegas 2004).The sensible
response of a central bank to increased uncertainty
is to react less aggressively to economic shocks,sim-
ply because it is prudent to be less active when the
outcomes of one’s actions are uncertain (Brainard
1967).A highly asymmetric and uncertain transmis-
sion of monetary policy hence implies that the ECB
will pursue a less active monetary policy than it has
been doing in the past.While the ECB has been fre-
quently criticized for pursuing a less active strategy
than other central banks such as the US Fed, this
criticism is not justified once one realizes that mon-
etary policy in the eurozone is inherently much
more difficult than in other currency areas. The
logic for this is of course grounded in the fact that
EMU member states are more diverse than those of
other single currency areas, and that the ECB, at
least initially, was faced with uncertain territory.
This problem is reinforced by enlargement of EMU
and so even more prudence can be expected from
the ECB.
The changed central bank reaction should obvious-
ly have consequences for financial markets and the
private sector as well. Private agents will realize a
lower ability and willingness of the common central
bank to respond to economic shocks or to intervene
to compensate for the negative effects of too gener-
ous wage and price increases. While the ECB has
always emphasized that it is not attempting to stim-
ulate employment or output with the help of mone-
tary policy, it has nevertheless intervened to stabi-
lize the economy in response to economic shocks
(albeit preserving the primacy of a low inflation
rate). Wage and price setters should realize that
monetary policy will be even less available as an
instrument of adjustment in a larger monetary
union than before.This should result in less aggres-
sive wage setting by unions and more careful price
setting by enterprises (Hefeker 2005). In a sense,
this might have beneficial effects, as wage and price
setters should place no expectations on the central
bank concerning a possible bail-out and instead
should make greater efforts themselves to become
less vulnerable to economic shocks. While this had
been the case for the smaller member countries in
the European Monetary System even before the
introduction of the euro, where countries like the
Netherlands, Austria and Belgium had long ago
given up their independent monetary policy and
pegged their currencies closely to the deutschmark,
this was less the case for the larger countries in the
EU. The same applies to the new member states;
there are some, like the Baltics and Slovenia that
gave up independent monetary policy from the
beginning, while others, like Poland and Hungary,
will have to do so upon entering EMU.Enlargement
of EMU will imply at least for the larger countries
that they will also have to adjust to a less active
monetary policy which is no longer able to address
national needs.Increased uncertainty about central bank behavior
But uncertainty will not only increase for the central
bank.One can also expect the larger ECB council to
become less predictable for financial markets and
the private sector, at least initially, than the smaller
council had been. This has to do with the fact that
new members with potentially different preferences
will enter the council which might shift the mone-
tary policy of the ECB. More members can shift the
majority on preferred monetary policy in compari-
son to the previous situation because systematically
different preferences influence the median position
that determines policy (Hefeker 2003). Some
observers, in contrast, claim that the ECB council is
dominated by some members, and that the official
‘one country, one vote’ system does not adequately
reflect the de-facto power distribution (Fatum
2006). However, even in this case it is well possible
that a larger group might effect a different outcome
as relative powers in the council could change. In
fact, even observers from national central banks
argue that the envisaged change in the council’s
decision-making system will lead to more uncertain-
ty, as nobody so far has any idea on how exactly
decisions are going to be taken in the larger council
(Servais 2006).
This at least is what happened in the early years of
the newly created ECB (Goldberg and Klein 2005).
It took financial markets a considerable time to deci-
pher the position of the new institution and to form
an adequate perception of what the position, behav-
ior and reaction of the ECB to any given develop-
ment would be. Only over time did markets and the
private sector learn what type of reaction could be
expected from the new central bank to real develop-
ments in member states.There is
little reason to expect that there
will not be a more or less pro-
longed period of uncertainty this
time as well.
Again, it is reasonable to expect
that the private sector will adapt
its behavior to any increase in
the uncertainty about the type
of central bank it faces. Just as
the central bank becomes less
active when setting monetary
policy in reaction to uncertainty,
the private sector will become
less aggressive in terms of wage
and price setting in response to
increased uncertainty about the monetary authori-
ty’s reaction function. Theoretical work has shown
that an uncertainty reaction function of the central
bank will lead to more restraint in unions’ wage set-
ting (Grüner 2002), and there is empirical evidence
as well to show that for certain types of national
labor markets a disciplinary influence of increased
uncertainty on wage setting behavior of labor union
can indeed be found (Grüner et al. 2005). Prelimin-
ary evidence for the eurozone accordingly shows
that wage setting in the common currency area has
become less aggressive in response to the introduc-
tion of EMU (Posen and Gould 2006).This is reflect-
ed in the moderate development of nominal wages
in recent years (see Figure) . The positive effect on
employment should be reinforced when EMU is
enlarged.
Not only the private sector should be influenced by
the increased uncertainty about the reaction func-
tion of the central bank, government policy should
adapt as well. Losing monetary policy as an alterna-
tive adjustment instrument in response to economic
shocks should increase the willingness of govern-
ments to implement politically undesirable structur-
al reforms in labor and product markets. (Hefeker
2006). Governments, which are usually averse to
reforms in product and labor markets because of the
political cost of reforms, will usually rely on the cen-
tral bank to help stabilize the economy in case of
economic shocks. When monetary policy can no
longer provide this service, more efforts have to be
undertaken by the private sector, and the govern-
ment might itself be forced to help make the econo-
my less vulnerable to shocks by increasing product
and labor market flexibility.A loss of monetary pol-
icy will thus even pressure reluctant governments to
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undertake more reforms.An increase of uncertainty
about the central bank’s behavior will reinforce this
process as it is, from the point of view of govern-
ment, akin to a loss of monetary policy as an instru-
ment of adjustment or a shift to a more conservative
central bank.
Incidentally, this result has also implications for the
debate about central bank transparency (Geraats
2002). Observers often criticize the ECB for being
not open enough and being less transparent than
other central banks, like the Bank of England or the
Swedish National Bank.While there are many good
arguments for high central bank transparency, the
argument introduced above suggests that not having
full transparency can have beneficial effects on wage
setting and government reform policy.
Enlargement is likely to have positive effects
While conclusions about the likely effects of an
enlargement of EMU are highly speculative and
subject to a large degree of uncertainty, one con-
clusion at least seems quite clear:There is no indi-
cation whatsoever that the monetary policy of the
ECB will become more active than it is currently.
As argued above, it is likely that the larger central
bank’s policy will become less active because of
higher transmission uncertainty and because eco-
nomic divergences among member countries will
increase, making it even less likely that the ECB
will tailor its policy to the need of any particular
group of countries. This confirms the old conclu-
sion that monetary policy in a monetary union is
less of a ready-to-use instrument than national
monetary policy implemented by a national insti-
tution.
While this situation is relatively new for Germany, it
is well known for the smaller members of the old
EMU,where countries like Belgium,Austria and the
Netherlands were used to having a monetary policy
aiming mainly at stabilizing exchange rates so that
national adjustment had to come from other areas
and policies.And it is also a well known principle in
the Baltic countries and Slovenia.Germany,and pos-
sibly Poland and Hungary, will have more problems
with acknowledging that monetary policy is lost for
good as an instrument for stabilization.More adjust-
ment will instead have to come from the labor mar-
kets and the deregulation of product markets and
the service sector.
Enlargement is therefore likely to be a continuation
and reinforcement of a process in which member
states increasingly realize the loss of an economic
policy instrument which had been used more or less
freely before monetary union. Larger states will
have more problems adjusting to this situation than
smaller ones,but eventually they will also have to do
so. In the best case, enlargement can work to speed
up reforms.Enlargement is thus as much in the inter-
est of the older members as it is in the interest of the
candidates. If, however, larger members fail to real-
ize the implications of enlargement, there will be
transitory adjustment costs.
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